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THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The most notable feature in the annals
of the society during the past month was
Prof. Woodward's lectpre on Lord Mansfield. The subject was treated in much
the same manner as his former lectura on
Chief Justice Marshall, These lectures
have been especially valuable for the
reason that they were not merely biographical sketches, but were instructive expositions of the characters of these men and of
the positions they occupied in legal history
and literature.
Debates of much interest and benefit
have been held at the various meetings.
Papers were read by Messrs. Osborne,
Clark and Yeagley. The Dickinson Society Weekly has continued to be a source
of much entertainment.
The regular election of officers was held
on April 12th. Mr. H. Brooks was elected
president; Mr. Detrick, vice president; Mr.
Shanz, secretary; lMr. Fox, treasurer, and
Mr. J, Rhodes, sergeant-at-arms.

ALUMNI NOTES.
Leon C. Prince, '99, who is at presen
assisting his fitther, who holds the chair of

History and Political Science in Dickinson
College, has recently published an article
in the "Arena," entitled "The Passing o
the Declaration," which has brought him
into prominence among the constitution-

alists and politicians of the whole United
States. Mr. Prince has certainly prepared
an excellent paper on the subject, and one
which students of Democracy or. Republicanism would do well to read.
Claude Ld. Roth, '98, won the second
prize in the annual junior oratorical costest of the University of Pennsylvania
held April 18; he spoke on "Education in

Patriotism;" there were six competitors.
Hugh J. Gallagher, '96, spent several
days in town about April 10th. He reports being quite successful in his practice

at McAdoo.

THEFORUM.
HON. EDMUND L. RYAN.
HoIi. Edmund L. Ryan,
Mayor of Kane, Pa., was born
in that city February 18, 1875,
receiving his aeadenic edueation in the public -schools,
gradnating from the 1H igh
Jle spent
1892.
School i
about two years gaining \'aluable experience in surveyin,
on the lines of the Pennsylvaiia _Railroad and in niereantile pursuits, after which he
acted for a time as assistant to
his father who was then overseer of the poor of McKean
coun ty. In the fall of 1894 he
began the study of the law in
the office of a prominent attorney of his native county, and
entering the Dickinson School
of Law, was graduated with
the degree of LL. B., June,
1897, as one of the honor men
of his class.
Beginning the practice of his
profession in his native city
two months later, unlike most
men who adopt this profession
,1X_
he was not compelled to undergo a long and trying novitiate,
Lut at once sprang into promwill be properly conserved and promoted
inence asarespected and trusted counbel,,r.
under his guidance.
Fortune has smiled upon his professional
Notwithstanding the exten,,sive official
labors, rewarding them with a good share
and professional exactions upon his time,
of profit and honor. He has a lucrative
lie is a prominent member of the Board of
practice and is prominent and influential
Trade, taking a lively interest and exertin political and social life in the coniniuni ng himself actively in the dev elopmen t of
ity, of which a signal proof was given in
February, 1900, in his election to the Ma- the natural resources of the community,
being interested to a more or less degree in
yorality by the largest majority ever rethe production of oil and the manufacture
ceived by a candidate for the office in Ia ne.
of glass.
Mr. Rtyan is the youngest mayor in the
In his official life he has proved himself
state and his official duties involve a nmlan able, upright and impartial Mayor. pertiplicity of functions, some of them very
fectly acquainted with the laws and orditrying and vexatious, such as superintendnances of the city and making them the
ing all the police powers, the regulation of
invariable rule of his conduct. As to his
the municipality and holdingpolice court.
professional ability, reference need but to
in which breaches of the peace and other
be made to the reputation he has made as
violations of city ordinances are tried; but
a careful and considerate counselor.
his capacity, integrity, tact and faithful
The virtues of his private character, less
attention to the work enables him to get
conspicuous in their nature and consethrough them all with comparative ease
quently less generally known, endear him
and pleasure and to demonstrate that the
to those who are more intimately assoaffairs of the city are safe in his hands and
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ciated with him, and who see him in the
more retired scenes of life. Hissociability
finds expression, in part, in the good fellowship incident to fraternal orders, belonging to the Free and Accepted Mlasons,
the Odd Fellows, The Elks and is a member of the Tribe of Ben Hur.
While practicing but a few years, ir.
Ryan may be justly said to be the most
promising young lawyer of McKean county.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The work of this society duringthe past
month has been of a most encouraging nature, the interest shown by all the members being great and the character of the
programmes being such as to insure valuable and interesting sessions. The administration of President Barr, just closed, has
been one of the most successful in the history of the society
During the past month the society attended the lecture of Prof. F. C. Woodward, under the auspices of the Dickinson
Society, at their invitation, and listened
also to interesting addresses in their own
hall by Messrs. Phillips, Kaufman and
McGuffie.
The regular election of officers took place
on Friday, April 12, and was a hotly contested and lively contest. The new officers
are:
President-Alexander.
Vice President-Phillips.
Secretary-Helriegel.
Treasurer -Conry.
Executive
Committee-MfcKeeh an,
Welkl and Donahoe.
This will be the last official term of the
school year and all are urged to attend
regularly and make the final term of this
year's work the best, in point of numbers,
enthusiasii and work done, in the history
of the organization. At the next election
all the offices will be filled by gentlemen of
the junior class, who will hold over till the
opening of the school next year.
BOOK REVIEWS.
"Mrs. Cherry's Sister" by Minnie W.
Baines-Miller. Cloth, pp. 355, S.90. Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye.

This book is not a sermon nor a treatise,
but a fascinating story. Mrs. Baines-Miller, whose writings are well known to the
reading public and whose books appeal to
the heart through the good common sense
shown in her pictures of real life and character, seeks in this book to reach the
judgment through natural and attractive
studies of character taken from real life.
The author does not claim to cover the
field of the psychologist and does not make
any display of her knowledge of his methods, but makes free use of the results of his
work in her delineations of characters and
situations throughout the story.
This
book will do much towards a better understanding of the fascination which Christian Science has for so many minds.
"David, TheBoy Harper" by Mrs. Annie
E. Smiley. Cloth, pp. 300, price S.90.
Cincinnati: Jennings & Pye.
The author of this modest sized volume
is too well known to the public to make
much comment on the above named book.
The principal character portrayed by the
author is David, King of Israel; his life is
given ini detail and has been written for an
excellent purpose, namely, that of eniplasizing the fact that the boy makes the
man. The author is to be commended for
her excellent style and make-up of the book
in general.
The following is a continuation of the
schedule of counsel in the Moot Court
cases issued in last month's FonuUr.
Plaintiff.

Defendant.

Case No. 127.5. Gery,
Johnston,
Henderson,
Katz.
Deal, J.
12t. Mitchell,
Taylor,
Stauffer,
Kern.
Hess, J.
127. Valentine,
Kemp,
Kennedy,
Clark.
Gery, J.
128. Brooks, H.,
Melntyre,
MacCounell,
Rhodes, F.
Rhodes, J.
129. Thorne,
Nicholls,
Turner,
M[oon.
Trude, J.
130. Barr,
Minnich,
Kostenbauder, Points.
Harpel, J.
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Plaintiff.

Case No. 131. Shipman,
"

132.

"

"

..

1134.

.

.11135.

133.

136.

137.

1 138.

"

139.

9 140.

"

141.

"

142.

4.

143.

"

11 144.

145.

146.

Defendant.

Basehore,
Kline, Dan.
Piper.
Johnston, J.
Harpel,
Edwards,
Lonergan,
Osborne.
Marx, J.
Helriegel,
Lambert,
Peightel.
Vastine,
Detrich, J.
Elhnes,
Trude,
Rhodes, J.
Conrey.
Shipman, J.
Hoagland,
Lauer,
Cannon,
Phillips,
Kostenbauder, J.
Boryer,
Adamson,
Detrich,
Sterrett.
Basehore, J.
Hickernell,
Fox,
Miller,
McGuffie,
Brock, J.
Ebbert,
Donahoe,
Kline, C.
Gerber,
Brooks, J.
Longbottom,
Sherbine,
Rogers.
Sclnee,
Turner, J.
Brock,
MacConnell
McKeehan,
McIntyre.
Kline, Dan., J .
Jones,
Keelor,
Mays.
Crary.
Taylor, J.
Cisney.
Wollner,
Nralsh.
Mundy,
Conrey, J.
Welsh,
Williamson.
Yeagley.
Wright,
Thorne, J.
Delaney,Leroy, Watson,
Brennan,
Cooper.
Alexander, J.
Delaney, E. A., Gross,
Claycomb,
Schanz,
Marx, J.
Moon,
Minnich,
"Brooks, H.,
Rhodes, F.,
Nicholls, J.

MOOT COURT.
HEIRS OF JOHN JONES vs. ANN
THOMPSON.
Valid marriages- When widow not entitled to letters of administration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Jones was married in 1865, in England, to Mary Smith. In 1870 he left his
wife, and a few months later came to Philadelphia.
In 1875 he married Ann Thompson,.the
first wife being still alive in England. In
1895 the first wife died in England. In
1900 John Jones himself died in Philadelphia.
The second wife, Ann Thompson, applies for letters of- administration on the
estate. A caveat is filed protesting against
the granting of letters of administration
to her on the ground that she was never
legally his wife, and that therefore she had
no right in the estate, and was not entitled
to any part of it.
GEiY and ADAMSON for heirs.
The prior marriage of Jones rendered his
second marriage void. Howardv. Lewis,
6 Phila. 50; Kenly v. Kenly, 2 Yeates 207;
Heffner v. Heffher, 23 Pa. 104.
Death of first wife did not validate marriage. Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294.
CONRY and CooPEit for the widow.
The death of Mary Smith in lifetime of
Jones validated the second marriage. 2
Brews. 189; 4 Johns. 52; 2 S. & R. 4.
OPINION OF REGISTER OF WILLS.

The questions to be decided in this case
are as follows: The first wife, Mary Smith,
being alive at time of marriage to Ann
Thompson, was the .,econdmarriage meretricious, and did it continue so, the first
wife dying before Jones? And was the
marriage to Ann Thompson legal or invalid? Has she any right to share in the
estate?
At common law there were two kinds
of disabilities affecting the validity of the
marriage relation. The first Were termed
canonical, depending on the law of the
church. Among these were consanguinity
and affinity. These causes rendered a
marriage voidable only, and it was necessary that the nullity should be declared
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during the lifetime of the parties, otherwise they were and continued valid for all
civil purposes.
The second kind were civil disabilities,
such as prior marriage, idiocy, fraud,
force, etc. These made the contract void,
ab initio, and the union meretricious. In
such cases no sentence of nullity was required, but at all times the parties or afterward, the marriage might be considered
and treated as null and void. Walter's
Appeal, 70 Pa. 392; Johnson's Appeal, 9
Casey 515.
In this case Jones knew when he married the respondent that lie was violating
thelaws of religion and morality in living
with her as his wife, and that he committed the crime of bigamy while his first
wife was living. He had no reason to
suppose her to be dead. As to the respondent, she was married to Jones in 1875, and
undoubtedly believed him to be her lawful husband. She had never heard of his
former wife or marriage as far as this case
shows. There is no presumpition of any
guilty intent or misconduct involvingany
moral turpitude on her part in cohabiting
and living with Jones under her marriage
with him, honestly contracted by her, and
duly soleinnized ini875. Heffner v. HefI
ner, 2.3 Pa. 104.
'The marriage was clearly illegal, and as
to Jones meretricious but not as to the respondent; there is evidence to show that
she was deceived.
Tie general rule is that a relation shown
to have been illicit at its comiuiencemont
is presumed to continue so until proof of
change. In the case at bar the fact is
found the marriage was void, illegal and
invalid at its commencement, and coutinued so down .o the death of the first
wife, and that there was not a marriage in
fact between the date of the death of the
first wife and the death of Jones. This is
conclusive against respondent. She has
failed to estalish her claim as widow, and
has, of course, no right to participate in
the distribution of the decedent's estate,
nor is she entitled to letters of administration. Heart's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294; Yaidley's Estate, 25 P. F. Smith 208.
KERN,. Register.
OPINION OF THE ORPHANS' COURT.
In re caveat filed to prevent granting of

letters to Ann Thompson in estate of John
Jones.
In 1875 John Jones, the decedent, married the applicant for letters in this case,
Ann Thompson. At this time lie had a
wife living in England by the name of
lfary Smith, who continued in full life
until 1895, when she died. From 1875 to
1895, and thereafter, until 1900, Jones
lived and cohabited with Ann Thompson,
when he died.
The evidence shows that at the time of
the marriage to the claimant in 1875, the
decedent had a wife in full life from whom
he had not been divorced. Under all the
authorities this second marriage under
such circumstances was void. Wayne
Township v. Porter Township, 138 Pa. 181;
Heffner v. Heffner, 23 Pa. 104.
It is true that the parties cohabited together and bore the repute of being man
and wife for five years after the death of
Mary Smith.
"But cohabitation and
reputation alone are iot marriage. They
are merely circumstances fron which a
marriage may sometimes be presumed.
This presumption may, however, be rebutted by other facts and circumstances."
Appeal of Insurance Company, 113 Pa.
204. "It wholly disappears in the face of
proof that no marriage. has in fact taken
place." Estate of Grimm, 131 Pa. 199.
"When a relation between a mnan and
woman living together is illicit in the
commencement, it is presumed to continue
so until a changed relation is proved.
Without proof of a subsequen t actual marriage, it will not be presumed from continued cohabitation and reputation of a
relation between then which was of illicit
origin." Appeal of Insurance Company,
supra; appeal of Grimm, supra; Drinkhouse estate, 151 Pa. 294; Hunt v. Clark,
6 Pa., C. C. 592.
The niarriage may not have been meretricious as far as Ann Thompson is-concerned. She may have been deceived, yet
it was clearly illegal. The cohabitation
was illicit in its commencement, and neces.sarily contimued so down to the death of
the first wife, and it is admitted that no
actual marriage was celebrated from that
time to the date of the death of the decedent. We cannot but conclude, therefore,
that Ann Thompson has failed to establish

THE FORUM.
her claims as a widow. Hunt's Appeal,
86 Pa. 294; Hantz v. Sealy, 6 Binney 405.
Letters of administration must be refused.
THOS. NELSON vs. JOS. CARTER.
Bight to recover damagesfor the breachof
an oral agreement for the sale of land,
when the vendee hasmade improvements
-M£easure of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On May 1, 1900, Carter made an oral
agreement with Nelson by which he sold
Nelson a certain building lot for $500, possession to be given immediately and the
price to be paid on Aug. 1, 1900, when Carter was to deliver the deed.
Nelson took possession and erected a
house which was worth $2,000. But when
he tendered the $500 on Aug. 1, 1900, Carter refused to take it and refused to give a
deed, claiming that the contract could not
be enforced against him by reason of the
Statute of Frauds.
Nelson now brings action against Carter
to recover $2,000, the value of the house.

J. RHODES and TR.UD for theplaintiff.
The vendor in A parol contract for the
sale of land is liable in damages for its
breach, in Pa. The 4th section of the
English 8tatute of Frauds, as it relates lo
land is not in force in Pa. Bell v. Andrews, 4 Pall. 152; Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn.
450; Allen's Estate, I W. & S. 388; Postlethwait v. Freae, 31 Pa. 472.
The measure of damages is the actual
loss to the vendee. Harris v. Harris. 70
Pa. 170; Sausett v. Steinwetz, 8 W. N. 100.
THuOnRNE and MACCONNELL for defendant.
The value of improvements put upon
the land does not constitute the measure.
of damages. The vendee can recover for
his actual loss, and not the value of his
bargain. Wilson v. Clark, 1 W. & S. 5.54;
Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424; McDowell v.
Dyer, 21 Pa. 417; Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 260.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is
to compel men to manifest their intentions
in writing, so that land-title may be traced
by certain and enduring evidence. If left
to parol, the death of witnesses, the mistakes of witnesses, the temptation to per-

jury, invite discord and confusion and
render land-title uncertain and defective.
And to promote the peae(- and happiness
of society the legislature has prescribed
certain solemnities, without which the
title to land cannot be transferred, thus
securing clearness and facility in ascertaining tile to land and preventing those
frauds and perjuries which would inevitably lake place.
Our act of Assembly, "for the prevention
of frauds and perjuries," is a transcript of
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd sections of the English Statute of Frauds. We omit the 4th
section of the English Statute which declares, "that no action shall be brought
whereby to charge any person upon .any
contract of sale of lands, tenements, hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought or
some memorandum or note thereofshall be
in writing, signed by the party to be
charged therewith, qrsomeperson lawfully
authorized."
Thus our Statute of Frauds does not declare a parol agreement for the sale of
lands void if not reduced to writing and
signed by the parties, nor does it forbid an
action for damages for the breach thereof.
It goes no further than to limit the operation of the contract in creating and passing an estate or interest in lands, leaving
the common law unaltered whereby the
party who refuses to perform an oral contract is liable to be sued and respond to the
other in damages.
In the case at hand, the vendor complains that the contract it sets up is within
the Statute of Frauds, and therefore cannot be enforced. If no part of the contract
had been performed by either 1,arty, perhaps his refusal would be well grounded.
But the vendee has conformed to the
agreement in every particular. He took
immediate possession and tendered payment at the required time, and now, to allow the vendor to treat the agreement as
a nullity, after the lands have been enhanced in value by th vendee, would in
effect be using the statute as an instrument of fraud rather than a preventative.
It certainly would be fraudulent conduct
in a vendor to make a verbal sale of land
which he knew to be void and thus entice
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a vendee into great expenditures of money
and labor, which he meant to reap the
benefit of himself.
The plaintift does not ask for performance of the contract; he asks for damages
for the breach of it. He has fully performed his part. The vendor refuses to
deliver tbe deed which he is in position to
do. He demands as damages the expense
he incurred in the erection of the house.
Recoveries in actions of this nature have
been sustained by our courts from the
earliest periods.
The first case was Bell v. Andrews, 4
Dal]. 152. The action there was by the
vendee, not to enforce the contract, or to
give him the profit and benefit of it-this
was forbidden by the statute-but to recover damages, that should restore him to
his rights, as they were before the contract.
Lowry v. Mehafi:y, 10 Watts 389, illustrates the law on this subject exactly.
Kennedy, J., says "from all that is contamined in the statute, it is perfectly manifest that an executory contract for the
sale of real estate or made for the purpose
of effecting it in any way is not to be regarded otherwise than as binding upon the
parties, though not reduced to writing and
signed by them; and that in case of either
refusing to perform it, he makes himself
liable to the other for the loss which the
latter shall sustain by reason of such nonperformance."
In Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319, the action was brought by the vendee, against
the vendor, to recover damages for the
breach of parol bargain for the conveyance
of land. Held, that the vendor is bound
to compensate the vendee, not for the loss
of his bargain, but for his expenses and
trouble incurred.
In accordance with this train of decisions, Thompson v. Shepler, 72 Pa. 160;
Allison v. Montgomery, 107 Pa. 455. and
Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa, 342. have been
decided.
The only other question for our consideration is the question of the amount of
damages.
If anything can be regarded as settled it
must.be taken to be fully established as
the law of Pennsylvania that in an action
by a vendee, against a vendor, for a breach

of a parol contract for the sale of land, the
measure of damages is the money actually
paid and theexpense incurred on the faith
of the contract. Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa.
319; Riueer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342.
We therefore conclude that the reason
for the defendant's refusal to accept payment and deliver the deed is without merit
and judgment is entered in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum demanded.
By the Court,
JASPER ALEXANDER.

OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The contract between Nelson and Carter
was oral, and except for wl~at was done in
pursuance of it, fell within the. .-tdtute of
frauds. But two things were done in pursuance of it, which exempt the contract
from the operation of that statute: Nelson
took pnssession, and erected a house worth
$2000. He did not pay any portion of the
purchase money. These acts, it is well
settled, render the contract specifically
enforceable. Eberly v. Lehman, 100 Pa.
542. It is evident that Nelson, if defendant in ejectment, might have maintained
his right to the possession by means of the
contract, and the acts done by him in consequence of it. He could likewise have by
bill In equity, compelled Carter to execute
and deliver a deed for the premises, on the
tender of the $500.
When the money was tendered, Carter
refused, both to accept it, and to execute
a deed, and declared his intention not to
abide by the contract. In this respect the
case is unlike Allison v. Montgomery, 107
Pa. 455, where it was held that although
an oral contract might be rescinded, and
an action for damages sustained on it such
action could not be resorted to, unless and
until the contract had been in fact rescinded. The conduct of Carter was, at least in
intention, a rescission. Cf. Hathaway v.
Hoge, 1 Cent. 339.
As we have seen, Carter had no power
to cast off the contract. It was no longer
voidable, by reason of the statute of frauds.
Nor did any other cause exist for avoiding
it. Under such circumstances, may Nelson resort to an action for damages? The
action for damages, is the usual remedy
furnished by the courts of law, and it has
never been understood that the invention
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of the additional remedy in equity, deprived a party of his option to employ it
or the more ancient remedy at law. Despite the ability of Nelson to maintain his
possession and compel a conveyance, nothing hinders his betaking himself instead,
to the action for damages.
What damages is he entitled to? It
seems to have been assumed, by counsel
and the learned court below that the rule
was applicable, which regulates damages
for breach of unenforceable oral contracts.
Under this rule, there could be no recovery
for the loss of the bargain, that is, for the
difference between the actual value of the
land and the price agreed to be paid. This
rule is-clearly established. The vendee is
restricted to compensation for such outlay
as he has suffered in reliance on the vendor's intention to make the conveyance;
for searcher, for the scrivener's charges,
for the cest of a survey, for the improvements which he may have made. Holthouse v. Rynd, 155 Pa. 43; Rineer v. Collins, 156 Pa. 342; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa.
170; McCafferty v. Griswold, 99 Pa. 270.
But the reason of this rule, it is often
stated, is, that to allow for the value of
the bargain would be substantially to enforce the contract, and so defeatthe statute
of frauds.
It is by no means clear, however, that
any different rule would be applied in
Pennsylvania, even if the contract were in
writing, or were, although oral, enforceable. The decisions on this subject are
remarkably confused, and it is not necessary now, to investigate them. Cf. Dumars v. Miller, 34, 319; Tyson v. Eyrick,
141 Pa. 496, and the cases there cited. An
exception to the rule, with reqpect to parol
contracts, permits a recovery by the vendee, of the value of the bargain, where
there was fraud on the part of the vendor,
in making the contract; but his refusal to
perform the contract, although he is able
to do so, is not fraud. Rineer v. Collins.
15'; Pa. 342; Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 170;
Thomas v. Shepler, 72 Pa. 160. No fraud
on Carter's part, in making the contract,
is intimated. He has refused to perform
it, although he was aware, as we must assume, that Nelson had entered into possession and was making valuable improvements. This in deference to the authori-

ties, we must not regard as such fraud as
exposes him to liability to pay Nelson the
value of the bargain.
Nelson claims $2000, the mooey which
he has expended upon the lot. Though it
was not strictly correct to tell t he jury that
the sum expended is the measure of damages in all cases, we are unable to perceive
that the defendant has been injured by the
error. Had the land been conveyed to
Nelson, he would have had the lot aild
house, at all expense of 52500. It may
however, not have been worth so much in
the market. The expenditure may not
have been judicious. Let us suppose that
the lot and house are worth only S2000.
Then it is evident that the non-execution
of the contract l'as caused a loss to Nelson
of but $1500. The mere fact that Nelson
spent $2000 would not import that his Io.-in
from Carter's breach of contract wasS2000.
We think, howexer, that the jury wete
required, in the absence of evidence on the
point, to assume that the money expended
correspondingly enhanced the value of the
lot. Carter should have shown, if he
could, that it. did not. There was therefore no substantial error, under the circunistances, in submitting the expenditures to them, as the measure of daniages.
In adopting the rule thus propounded,
we should not feel compelled to extend it
so as to allow the vendee, in case his expenditures should more than corre.,pondingly enhance the value of the lot, t) recover, as damages, this increment.
We are aware of a certain inconsistency
between the view thus expressed. and the
theory that the principle applicable to
covenants of warranty, governs in actions
for the breach, by a Vendor, of his contract
to convey land. If A conveys land to B,
with a covenant of warranty, B, on a subsequent eviction recovers on the covenant
only the purchase money paid, although
he may have spent twenty times as much
in improving the premises, and this principle is cited in several cases, tojuslify the
refusal to a ven(lee of the vailue of his
bargain, when the ventdor declines to make
It is evident that the
the conveyvance
same principle, logically applied. would
preclude a recovery by the vendee, for the
improvements put upon the premises.
Cases cited supra, however, recognize a
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right to compensation for improvements,
and we are reconciled to the effectuation
ofjustice, though at the expense of logical
coherence and consequence.
Judgment affirmed.
ALEXANDER CLARK vs. LAFAYETTE INSURANCE CO.
Forfeiture of policy for non-payment of
premium- What is reasonable attempt
to pay premium.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Clark was holder of a policy for $2000 on
the life of his wife, Julia Clark, the premium being$52 per year, payable in weekly
installments of $1. Among other terms
printed on the face of the policy were
these: "First, All premiums shall be payable to a regular collector of the company
or at the Home Office." "Second, In case
the collector fails to call for a premium, it
shall be the duty of the insured to pay
such premium at the Home or District
Office." The policy also contained a stipulation to the effect that in case of any default in the payment of the weekly premium, the policy might be cancelled by
the company.
After the policy had been in operation
for a considerable time, Clark went, on a
certain day, to the District Office of the
Company to pay his weekly premium. He
found the office open but with no one in
charge, and after waiting from three o'clock
until about 3.10 P.m., he went home.
This was the last day upon which premium could be paid, but two or three days
later Clark met Zcollector of the company
and offered to pay the over-due premium.
The collector accepted the money, with
the understanding that in case the company should refuse to continue the policy
in force, it would be returned to him. The
company found, upon investigation, that
Mrs. Clark was in very poor health, and
therefore refused to continue the policy
after default. The premium paid to the
collector was thereupon tendered to Clark,
Who refused to accept it, and later-two
days before another premium was dueJulia Clark died.
Alex. Clark now brings action against
the company for $2000.

and KATZ for plaintiff.
The tender was sufficient, 11eing made at
a proper time and place and the failure to
pay being caused by the neglect of the defendant. Carpenter v. Stephens, 12 Wend.
589; Roberts v. Beatty. 2 P. &W. 63; Smith
v. Loomis. 7 Conn. J10; 7 Am. & Eng. En.
of Law 147, (2nd Ed.)
The question as to the reasonableness of
the time must be left to the jury.
VALENTINE for defendant.
The payment of the premium being a
condition precedent, which was not c miplied with, the cancellation of the policy
was proper. Lantzv. Ins. Co., 139 Pa. 546;
Howell v. Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 276; Ruse v.
Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 516.
To excuse non-performance of a condition in a policy it must appear that it
could not by any means'have been acconiplished. Beebe v. Johnson. 19 Wend. 500;
Wheeler v. Ins. Co., 82 N. Y. 543: Ins. Co.
v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24; Klein v. Ins. C0.,
104 U. S. 88.
The jury would not be justified in finding plaintiff's attempt to pay an effective
one.
TAYLO

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Under the second term in the insurance
policy the insured was bound to pay the
premium and to pay it at the District or
Home Office. If he failed to make the
weekly payments the policy stipulated for
a cancellation at the option of the insurance company.
It has been repeatedly held that such a
stipulation is of the very essence and substance of the contract and non-payment of
the premium when due involves absolute
forfeiture, Kleim v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 88;
Ins. Co. v. Stathan, 93 U. S. 24. When a
person by express contract engages absolutely to do an act not impossible or unlawful at the time, neither inevitable accident, nor other unforeseen contingency not
within his control will excuse him for the
reason thathe might have provided against
them by contract, Wheeler v. Ins. Co., 82
N. Y. 543; Dexter v. Norton, 47 id. 62;
Harmany v. Bingham, 12 id. 99-107; Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 id. 275.
There are, however, one or two limits to
this doctrine but the courts seem averse to
applying them where they can find an excuse, especially in insurance cases. In
Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, it was
held that to excuse non-performance in
such cases, it must appear that the act to
be done could not by any means have been
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accomplished. See also. Miller v. Phillips,
31 Pa. 218.
The plaintiff contends, and correctly we
think, that if he was prevented by the defendant from performing the condition, he
is excused. Thus where an agent was
designated as receiver and was changed,
delay due to such change not notified to
the asssured will not create a forfeiture,
Ins. Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572; Seaman's Co. v. N. W. Ins. Co., 1 McGray
508. So also if a foreign company gives up
its office in the domicile of the insured, and
has no legally constituted agent there,
Dorion v. Positive, 23 Lr. Can. Jur. 261.
But the question still arises was the defendant company at fault. The plaintiff
called at its offide, found the office open,
remained there ten minutes and then departed. Why the agent was absent we do
not know. The necessities of business
often require the absence of a nun from
his office. We cannotsee that wen minutes
was an unreasonable time to he away.
The office was open showing that the
agent expected to return shortly. Under
these circumstances we think the plaintiff
waited an unreasonably short time, especially since it does not appear that he made
any effort to pay the premium later in the
day. We do not think that under the circumstances of the case the jury could legitimately draw an inference of impossibility
of performance which was caused by ihe
fault of the defendant company, and therefore refuse to submit the case to the jury.
Baker v. Lewis, 33 Pa. 301; Carbalic v.
Newberry Twp., 132 Pa. 91.
But the counsel for the plaintiff has also
contended that the defendant company
was guilty of fraud for refusing to continue
the policy because of Mrs. Clark's ill heal th
which they learned upon investigation.
This contention we cannot sustain. We
have already decided that the company
was not in duty bound to continue the
policy. To discontinue it is therefore no
wrong. Besides the elements of fraud are
entirely wanting.
There was no false
representation nor the concealment or
failure to disclose a material fact. On the
contrary the agent received the money
with an understanding that the policy
might be cancelled and the money refunded. Nor did the plaintiff suffer any dam-

age for the company stands ready to return the premium paid after the expiration of the policy. For the above reasons
the non-suit requested by the defendant
company is granted.

W. T.

STAUFFER,

J.

COMMONWEALTH vs. THOMAS
SCANLON.
Competency of child a3 witness-Competency a question for the court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Scanlon, on trial fur larceny of a watch,
a witness ws called by the Commonwealth who ,. :is )ut 7 yt.ars o age. Objtectiou wasmade to him, because u nacquaiuted with the nature of an oath and too immature to give a tru-t worthy narration of
facts. He was interr,,gated after instruction as to the nature of an oath, and the
court, remarking, that it did not think
the witness competent, but that it would
let the jury hear the evidence and decide
whether he was competent, allowed him
to testify. Conviction. Motion for new
trial.
ScHNFm: and YEAGLEY for the motion.
1. The child was not a competent witness. Com. v. Carey, 2 Brews. 404; Coin.
v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1.
2. The question of competency was for
the court. Corn. v. Ellinger, 1Brews,. 352
DeFrance v. DeFrance, 34 Pa. 385.
ROGERS and WATSON, contra.
1. The child was competent. 10 Mich.
372.
2. Competency of witness on some disputed fact may be properly left to the jury.
Lee v. Line, I W. N. C. 453; State v.
Seanton, 58 Mo. 204.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is a motion made by the defendant,
Thomas Scanlon, for a new trial on the
ground of an incompetent witness having
been admitted to testify.
The defendant was convicted for the
larceny of a watch; during the trial the
Commonwealth called a witness who was
seven years old; objection was made to
his testifying for the reason that he did
not understand the nature of an oath and
that he was too immature to give a trustworthy narration of facts.
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The witness was instructed as to the
nature of an oath and interrogated. The
court allowed him to testify, remarking
that it did not think the -witness competent, but would let the jury hear the
evidence and decide whether he was competent.
Whether a witness is competent to testify or not is a question for the court; for
if a witness be objected to on the ground
of unripeness or imbecility of mind, in all
these and like cases the preliminary question of admissability must in the first
instance be exclusively decided by the
judge, however complicated the circumstances may be.
Taylor's Evidence, 8 Ed. V. I. Art. 23.
This is the doctrine of the text-book and
is followed in Pennsylvania.
DeFrance v. DeFrance, 34 Pa. 385.
This being the doctrine in Pennsylvania,
the court could not delegate its authority
to the jury, it alone was to determine
whether the child was a competent witness and it decided that the child was not
competent, for the court said "I do not
think the child competent to testify;" it
was, therefore, error to admit the witness.
The motion for a new trial is sustained
and a new trial awarded.
JOSEPH RHODES, J.
JORN WHIPPLE vs. ELECTRIC
LIGHT CO.
Negligence-Scope of employment.
STATEM5ENT OF THE CASE.

John Banes, employed by the Company
to take out the burnt carbons each morning and replace them with new, removed
one on the morning of Nov. l1th 1899, at
a certain corner and inste:,d of droppingit
in a bag which he usually carried for that
purpose tossed it towards the gutter of the
street. Whipple then passing along the
pavement paused a moment and glanced
up to observe Banes, when he received the
carbon in the left eye, which was thus deprived of sight. This is action for $2,000
damages. Evidence was offered by defendant that Banes seeing a dog on thestreet
playfully tossed the carbon with the object of hitting the dog. He had been dis-

tinctly charged in all cases to put the burnt
carbons in the bag. Had Whipple not
stopped when he did, he would not have
been struck.
BRENNAN and WILLIABISON for plaintiff.
Master is liable for acts of servant done
in scope of employment. R. R. v. Derby,'
14 How. 467; Hays v. Miller, 77 Pa. 238.
Fact that plaintiff stopped will not prevent a recovery. Newcomb v. Boston
Dept., 140 Mass. 596.
LEROY DELANEY and M AYS for defendant.
Plaintiff might have avoided injurv by
use of reasonable care. He therefore cannot recover. Beathy v. Gilmore, 16 Pa.
463; Ry. v, Taylor, 104 Pa. 306.
Act of servant was beyond scope of employment, hence defendant is not liable.
Walton v. Car Co., 139 Mass. 5.56; Ry. V.
Welcome, 19 Ohio. 110.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is well settled law that the master is
liable for the act of his servant within th
scope of his employment.
From the facts in this case there are
three questions which present themselves,
viz.:
1. Was Banes, the employee of the Electric Light Co., acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident ?
2. Is the Electric Light Co. liable if the
services were in the course of Banes' eiiployment, but in the matter complained
of he was acting contrary to the express
command of the company?
3. Did the fact that Whipple stopped
and looked up at Banes while lie was
trimming the light constitute contribu tory
negligence on his part?
The rule of rcspondcatsuperior,or that
the master shall he civilly liable for the
tortuouR acts of his servant, done in the
course of his employment, is of universal
application.

Whether the act. be one of

omission or commission, whether negligent. fraudulent or deceitful, if it be (lone
in the course of his employment, his nia.ter is responsible for it to a third person.
and it makes no difference that the master
did not authorize or even know of the servant's act or neglect, for even if lie disapproved or forbade it, lie is equally liable if
the act be done in the course of the set-
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vant's employment. Smith on Master
and Servant, page 152.
If the servant act improperly in the discharge of his duties, it does not relievethe
employer from liability; the ground is that
the master has put it in the servant's
power to act improperly by entrusting him
with these duties, and therefore should be
held liable.
The case of Sleath v. Wilson (9 Car. &
P. 607) states the law distinctly and correctly.
In that case a servant having his master's carriage and horses in his possession
and control, was directed to take them to
a certain place; but, instead of doing so,
he went in another direction to deliver a
parcel of his own, and returning, drove
against an aged woman and injured her.
Here the master was held liable for the
act of the servant, though at the time he
committed the offense he was acting in
disregard of his master's orders. The
master had trusted the carriage to his control and care, and in driving it he was
acting ii, the course of his employment.
Banes was employed by the Electric
Light Co. to trim their lamps, and in removing the carbons therefrom it is clear
that he was acting in the course of his
employment, but in throwing the carbon
to the ground, instead of putting it in a
bag, as he had been ordered to do, he was
doing it in away contrary to the master's
orders, but the company is, nevertheless,
liable.
A master is liable for the tortuous acts
of his servant when done in the course of
his employment, although they may be
done in disobedience to the master's orders.
Penna. & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 14
Howard 467.
The act of the plaintiff in stopping and
looking up at Banes as he was trimming
the light was not in itself negligence. To
constitute contributory negligence, his
position must have been so carelessly
taken as to contribute to the accident.
Newcount v. Boston Protective Dept., 146
mass. 596.
There seems to be no negligence on the
part of the plaintiff which directly contributed to the injury. The act of the
plaintiff in stopping and looking up at
Banes was only a condition to the happen-

ing of the accident, and.in no way the
cause of it.
We have made a careful examination of
the cases cited in the briefs of the defendant's counsel but are not convinced that
they apply to this case.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Guy THORNE, J.
COMMONWEALTH vs. SOULE.
A ot proper to ask witness if he has ever
been convicted of crime in order to discredit him-Must prove by producing
record-Falseanswer to such question is
perjury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Henry Soule, on trial for robbery, offered
himself as a witness. He was asked, on
cross-examination, whether he had ever
been convicted of an offence, or served a
sentence in jail or penitentiary, and
whether he had not stolen a watch on a
certain occasion (different from that at
which the imputed robbery occurred).
To this question he did not refuse to
answer, but answered "No." He is now
prosecuted for perjnry, on the allegation
that the answers were false. Motion to
quash.
)KLINE, C. S. and CLAYCOMB for plaintiff.
Whether or not the question is admissible, if the witness testifies falsely lie may
be convicted. Coin. v. Bassard, 2 Kulp
113.
The evidence was material, as affecting
the credibility of the witness. Com. v.
Knapp, 9 Pick. 496; Com. v. Kuntz, 2
Clark 375; People v. Johnson, 55N. Y. 512.
Fox and SHERBINE for defendant.
The question was improper as conviction
must be proved by the record. Buck v.
Coin., 107 Pa. 486; Stout v. Russell, 2
Yeates 334; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N.
Y. 298.
The question was not relative to a material matter. It is not relevant to show
that defendant has committed other and
similar crimes not connected with the one
in question. Boytlv. U. S.. 142 U. S.450;
Corn. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16; 'Lightfoot
v. People, 16 Mich. 507.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In order to sustain a prosecution of this
offense, and to constitute the legal guilt of
perjury, so that a court would be justified
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in passing a sentence upon a verdict of
guilty against one so charged, the following averments must be substantially set
forth on the record and sustained by proof
to the satisfaction of the court and jury.
1. The oath must be false; by this it is
understood that the party must know, or
believe, that what he is swearing is .false.
It is said by Chief Justice Tilghman, in
Corn. v. Cornish, 6 Binn. 249, "That, if a
man undertakes to swear to a matter of
which he has no knowledge, he is perjured, although what he has sworn turns
out to be true."
2. The intention must be wilful. The
wilfulness thus indicated seems to be,
when the false oath was taken, with some
degree of deliberation and consciousness
of what the individual is asserting, otherwise it would not amount to voluntary
corrupt perjury. 1 Hawk 319.
3. The proceedings musthejudicial. It
seenis to le well settled that all oaths
taken before those who are, in any way,
legally intrusted with the administration
of justice, in relation to any matter regularly bef'ore them, are perjuries; and if the
false oath is taken in any stage of the proceedings in the cause, although itdoes not
afect the finial judgment, or only has relation to .ome intermediate step to be taken,
or if the oath is taken by a party to the
cause, it is perjury.
4. The party must be lawfully sworn.
The oath must be taken before some one
who has competent authority to administer it. Hence if one swears falsely before an
individual who acts in purely a private
capacity, or before an officer who has no
legal authority to administer the particular
oath in question, it will not in the legal
defiiition of the offence amount to perjury.
5. The assertion must be absolute. It
has been held by ancient writers that no
oath shall amount to perjury, unless it be
sworn absolutely and directly; and, therefore, when one swears to a thing according as he thinks, remembers or believes,
he is not guilty of perjury. But the
modern writers seem to lay down a different rule, and it seems to be well settled,
that if a man swears that he believes that
to be true which he knows to be false, he
then swears absolute and the offense is
complete. This doctrine is expressly ruled
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in thecase of Corn. v. Carnish, 6 Binn. 250.
Where it is held that a man may be guily
of perjury in swearing to what lie believes
to be true. He must have some foundation for his belief.
6. The falsehood must be material to
the matter in question; for it has bee
held if it be of no importance, though the
oath be wilful and false, it will not be
perjury.
It is a settled principle of law where a
defendant in criminal l)rosecution, by becoming a witness, waives his privilege as
a defendant and places himself in the
same position as other witnesses, and is
subject on cross-examination to all the
legal objections to his credibility that any
other witness is subject to. I Greenleaf
Ev. 444 (b) , Coin. v. Barry, f Co. Ct. R.
216. But the question whether he had
ever been convicted of an offense or served
a sentence in jail or penitentiary, and
whether he had not stolen a watch on a
certain occasion, were not proper questions to ask a witness upon cross-examination, even for the purpose of affecting his
credibility. It was an attempt to prove
an alleged fact by incompetent evidence,
and the defendant's answer in the negative to an improper question would not
be sufficient to make it perjury, even if
his answer was false. The proper method
of proving his conviction on a former trial,
is to show the record for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of his statement. Buck v. Coin., 107 Pa. 491.
It is held in 8 Co. Ct. R. 216, Coin. v.
Barry, that in extreme cases where the
record cannot be obtained without the
greatest difficulty, a witness may, in the
discretion of the court-, be asked, for the
purpose of discrediting his testimony,
whether he has been convicted of a felony
or misdemeanor, but if the -record of the
conviction can be produced in court, it is
the best evidence and should be shown in
preference to asking the witness whether
he has been convicted or not.
In a case for slander, Sullivan v.
O'Leary, 146 Mass. 323, where the defendant, on cross-examination, was asked
whether he had not used abusive language
against a certain person, and whether he
had not been sued for the same, and settled it by paying a sum of money to the
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person, it was objected to, but the question was admitted and the defendant
answered it in the affirmative. Judge
Knowlton says, "This was contrary to
the well established rules of common law,
that one can't be proved to be guilty of an
offense for whichl he is ol trial by showing that at another time he committed a
similar offense." Com. v. Jackson, 132
lass. 16. The discretion exercised in regard to cross-examination should not
ordinarily go so far as to permit the introduction of evidence which has no legitimate relation to any of the issues on the
trial, and which is at the same time of
such a character as to be likely to be applied to them by the jury and improperly
to affect their verdict.
Again, conceding, for argument, that
the questions were relevant, that they
were material and that the defendant
answered them in the negative, there is
no proof that they amount to perjury.
There is no positive declaration that a
record of his conviction can be produced,
nothing but a mere assertion that the
answers were false.
To convict one of perjury, two witnesses
zre necessary, or one witness when the

testimony is corroborated by independent
circumstances, but in this case no positive
lroof is shown that the defendant has
sworn falsely, and we therefore feel justified in holding that the defendant can not
be convicted of the offense for which he is
charged. We, therefore, quash the indictment.
Wmf. H. TRUDE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The learned court below hasquashed the
indictment against the defendant, on the
ground that it shows that the alleged perjury was not an indictable offence. The
Commonwealth has appealed. Thejurisdiction of this court to entertain such appeal, is well established. Commonwealth
v. Bradney, 126 Pa.199; Hutchison v. Commonwealth, 82 Pa. 472; Commonwealth v.
Keenan, 67 Pa. 203. Was, then, the court
of quarter sessions in error ii quashing the
indictment?
Henry Soule, asked whether he had ever
been convicted of an'offence, said no, and
the indictment charges that in so doing
he swore falsely. The theory of the court

was, that the question was an improper
one, and therefore, a false answer to it was
dispunislable. Whether Soule had ever
been convicted was material, for the fact
of conviction would cast discredit upon
him as a witness. The proper mode of
proving this was the production of the
record of the court. Had the defendant
objected to the question he could not properly have been compelled to answer it.
He did not object, however, but answered
it. We are not aware that the principle
has ever been established, that false testimony can be given with impunity, with
respect to a material point, simply because
the normal mode of proof is presentation
of some other evidence than the testimony.
The contrary has been recognized. Says
Bishop, "whenever the court has admitted
evidence, however erroneously, its decision
has become to the jury the law for the occasion; they cannot overrule the judge on
the question and refuse to be influenced by
what the witness says. If now, what he
swears to is adapted to influence then and
it is corruptly false, it is perjury; otherwi.e,
if it can have no effect on their verdict."
2 Crim. Law 606; (Ed. of 1892.) Reg. v.
Gibbon, 9 Con. C. C. 105; Reg. v. Phillpotts
2 Den. C. C. 302. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 175 Mass. 152.
Henry Soule was also asked whether he
had ever served a sentence in prison or
penitentiary. He answered, no. Probably
this was an improper question. Serviceof
a term of imprisonment is pertinent only
as it presupposes a conviction, but from
this point of view it is important as affecting the credibility of a witness; U. S. v.
Lansberg, 21Blatch. 169. Theconviction,
as we have intimated, should be proven by
the record of the court. But, as the defendant, instead of objecting to the question,
answered it and answered it falsely he may
for the"reason already given, be convicted
of perjury.
The question concerning the stealing of
a watch was equally censurable with the
others. It might have been objected to.
But it was not objected to. It was falsely
answered. The answer was material upon
the credibility of the witness. It may
therefore constitute perjury.
Order and Judgment of Q. S., quashing
the bill of indictment, is reversed; the in-
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3. The right to remove fixtures, as fixed
dictment is reinstated; aud procedendo
in the original lease, does notattach to the
awarded.

GEORGE ORTON vs. RICHARD
GRANT.
jectment--Tenancy at sufferance-Right
to remove tradefixtures during term of
tenancy-Tenancyat sufferance defined.

new relation of tenant by sufferance.
Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144; 124 Mass.
571.
4. The fixtures erected by the plaintiff
became realty upon the expiration of the
lease, and trover will not lie for their recovery. Davis v. Moss, 2 Wright 346;
Darrah v. Baird, 101 Pa. 265.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In September, 1897, plaintiff leased certain premises from one Jordon for two
years, with option to renew lease for
another two years at expiration of first
term. At close of first term, however, he
neglected and refused to renew, but remained in possession. In November,
1899, Jordon sold the premises to defendant. Plaintiffthen offered to take renewal,
but detendant refused and summarily
ejected plaintiff from premises, permission
being refused to take away some trade fixtures which plai;itiff had annexed to the
premises, and which it is conceded he
might have removed at any time before
the close of his original term. Plaintiff
sues to recover value of the fixtues.
BROCK and DETRICK for plaintiff.

1. An action in trover will lie for trade
fixtures. 107 Pa. 106; 53 Pa. 271; 125 N.
Y. 341.
2. A lessee, who holds over with the express or implied consent of the landlord,
becomes a tenant from year to year. Philips v. Monges, 4 Whart..256; Laguerenne
y. Dougherty, 3.5 Pa. 45; 13 S. & S. 64; 4
Rawle 123; 1 Whart. 91; 38 Pa. 353; 126
Pa. 390.
3. A tenant from year to year has
the right to remove fixtures. Lemar
v. Miles, 4 Watts 356; David v. Moss, 38
Pa. 346; Darrak v. Baird, 101 Pa. 265; 171
Pa. 569; 124 Mass. 571; 125 N. Y. 341; 39
Mo. 178.
4 When land is conveyed which is in
the possession of a tenant, the vendee
takes it subject to the tenant's right to remove his fixtures. 10 Barb. 496; ol Maine
160; 39 Mich 150.
DAvis and BROOKS for defendant.

1. By remaining in possession after refusal to renew the lease, plaintiff becomes
a tenant at sufferance. Tiedeman oK Real
Prop., 189; Hemphill v. Flynn, 2 Pa. 144;
Fitzpatrick v. Childs, 2 Brews. -165.
2. A tenant at sufferance may be ejected
without previous notice. Tiedeman on
Real
Prop., 192; Rich v. Keyser, 4 Rawle
8i.

In September, 1897, plaintiff leased .certain premises from one Jordon for two
years, with option to renew lease for another two years at expiration of first term.
At close of first term, however, he neglected
and refused to renew, but remained in
possession. In November. 1899, Jordon
sold the premises to defendant, Richard
Grant. Plaintiff then offered to take renewal, but defendant refused and summarily ejected plaintiff from the premises, permission being refused to take away some
trade fixtures which plaintiffhad annexed
to premises, and which it is conceded he
might have removed at any time before
the close of his original term. The question presented to us is, has a tenant the
right to remove fixtures after the expiration of his tenancy? It is a well settled
rule of law that in order to remove fixtures
such removal must take place before or
simultaneous with expiration. But the
case before us is of a different category, in
this: that at the expiration of the original
term the defendant did not vacate but
still remained in possession from September
until November, a period of about two
months; The holding over after the expiration of the term differentiates this from
the ordinary case, as the remaining in
possession after
the
expiration
of
the term is by implication a renewal
of the original lease or term.
It is
a well settled rule of law that a tenant for
years who erects fixtures for the benefit of
his trade or business may, at any time during the term, remove them from the demised premises, but cannot after the expiration thereof unless he remains in possession and hold over so as to createan implied renewal of the lease. Davis v. Mass.,
2 Wright 346.
If a tenant remains in possession after
the expiration of his term, and performs
all the conditions of the lease, it amounts
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to a renewal of the lease from year to year,
and we think this defendant would be entitled to remove fixtures during the year.
When, however, we are dealing with the
question of an implied renewal of a tenancy
all the terms of the former lease must be
considered. The purpose is not to make a
new lease essentially different, but to continue the former so far as its terms may be
applicable. In its very nature the implied
renewal of a lease assumes a continuation
of its characteristic features. Hence If the
landlord elect to treat one holding over as
a tenant, he thereby affirms the form of
tenaficy under which the tenant previously held. If that was a tenancy from year
to year it will presumptively so continue.
The landlord cannot impose a longer term
nor one radically different from the former.
The general principle is, that a fixture
erected by a tenant on demised premises,
for the purpose of carrying on his trade, is
personal property and may be removed.
Lemas v. Miles; 4 Watts 330.
When a landlord suffers his tenant to
remain in possession after the expiration
of the tenancy, and receives rent from him
a new tenancy from year to year is established, and if no new agreement be entered
into the law will presume, in the silence
of the parties, that the tenant holds the
premises subject to all such covenants contained in tile original lease as applied to
his present situation. Phillips v. Monges,
4 Wharton 229.
The right of a tenant to remove fixtures
is a privilege conceded to him for reasons
of public policy, and may be waived by
him, and will be regarded as abandoned
by any acts inconsistent with a claim to
the buildings as distinct from the land,
and upon abandonment of the right by
tile tenant fixtures erected by him immediately become the property of the landlord
as a part of the land. A surrender of the
premises, after the expiration of the lease,
is such an abandonment as vests the title
in the landlord. If one enters into possession by the act or authority of the law, and
retain possession after the law ceases to
authorize it, be is a trespasser and not a
tenant at sufference. And a tenant at
sufferance would only exist where the
holding over is not in pursuance of an
agreement between the parties. Such an

agreement would change the relation from
a tenancy at sufferance to one -at will, or
from year toyear. And if the partie. have
not expressly agreed upon any other terms
the presumption is Ihat the tenant holds
over subject to the conditions of the former
lease. After viewingall the facts and laws
in the case we think a verdict should be
given in favor of the plaintiff:
Judgment entered for the plaintiff.
L. R. HOLCOM , J.
BOROUGH OF ASKAM vs. JAMES
THOMPSON.
Boroughs-Due notice must be given a
property holder when a pavement is to
be laid in front of his premises and
where he refuses to lay.such pavement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The borough of Askami passed an nrdinance requiring property owners on certain
streets to lay side walks and if not laid
within a certain time the borough authorities would lay them and collect from the
owners of property. One of the property
owners, James Thompson, failed to lay his
and the borough authorities acting upon
the advice of their attorney procev ded to
lay the walk and afterwards to collect.
The borough was non-suited, on the ground
that sufficient notice had not been given
of the intention of the borough to lay the
walk. ilas the borough any remedy now
to recover for the walk, and if not would
they be trespassing if they went and tore
the walk up and laid it down somewhere
else ?
BISHOP and DONEHOE for plaintiff.
GERBER and HICKERNELL for defendalit.
1. Boroughs are trespassers for acts not
done under due process 6f law. Rutherford's case, 72 Pa. 82; Hannock vs. The
Borough, 148 Pa. 635: Boyle v. Borough of
Haleton, 171 Pa. 167.
2. Trespassers cannot force compensation for improvements which they make
upon tile land of another; neithercan they
reclainl and remove such improvements
from the land.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The facts come before us in the form of
a case stated. The court is therefore confined strictly to a consideration of the
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specific facts presented; it cannot aid them
by any inference or implication. Lugg v.
Tracy, 104 Pa. 493; Diehl v. Iline, 3 Whart.
143; Berks Co. v. Pile, 18 Pa.°493.
The power of the court to render a decision must then depend upon the adequacy of the facts adduced to sustain an
intelligent judgment. If the case stated
is insufficient for this purpose it must be
quashed. Commonwealth v. Howard, 149
Pa. 302.
Such being the law it remains only to
ascertain the result of its application to the
facts. It is apparent at a glance that no
judgment can be entered for the reason
that the parties have notagreed what that
judgment shall be if the law is with the
plaintiff, nor what if with the defendant;
nor is there any principle agreed upon by
which the amount of damages shall be determined. This is a fatal defect, 18 Pa. 493.
But even if it -were possible to overlook this
grave irregularity, we cannot disregard the
further circumstance that the facts disclose no issue between the parties. Counsel for defendant have cited much law to
the effect that, a borough becomes a trespasser upon an attempt to remove a side
walk, the cost of which it has failed to recover, because laid without due notice to
the citizen. But it does not appear that
the side-walk has been removed, and in a
case stated arguments of counsel based
upon facts which do not appear in the
statement must be ignored. "Judgment
must be confined to the issue set forth,"
P. & R. R. Co. v. Waterman, 54 Pa. 337.
So if there be no issue, obviously there can
be no judgment.
Inasmuch as it does not disclose facts
sufficient to sustain an intelligent judgment, the case stated must be quashed.
BARR, J.
WM. FORBES vs. ASA PACKER.
Contract-Mistakeas to number of circulars tendered-damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Packer contracted with Forbes to have a
die or cut made of himself, and to print for
him 5,000 copies to circulate, which he,
Packer, was about to send out concerning

his business of furniture-maker. The price
was$35. Forbes made the die and printed
5,100 copies of the circulars. One hundred
of them he intended to keep and distribute
to advertise his own business of engraver,
but his employee put the 5,100 into the
packageand delivered it to Packer, who
paid the $35 at once. Forbes discovering
the error, demanded 100 circulars of
Packer, who refused to deliver them, having already mailed them after discovering
the excessive number, and intending to
pay for the excess. He also refused to
allow Forbes to use the cut in order to
print other impressions. The valueof the
100 circulars to Forbes would be SIO, and
it would cost $15 to make a new cut and
print 100 impressions.
KAUFMAN and MoWRY for plaintiff
1. A person who assumes dominion of
the property of another doesso at his peril,
and, without regard to his motives, is responsible in damages if by means of his
act an injury is inflicted upon the'real
owner. 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
715; 76 Pa. 496.
2. There was an implied contract that,
plaintiff should have the rightof using the
cut for the purpo-e of making the extra
circulars, and defendant's refusal to permit such use renders him liable fora breach
ot contract.
3. Where a loss must be sustained by one
of two innocent persons, it must be borne
by him whose act was the cause of it. 4
Rawle 318.
ELDER and PHILIPS for defendant.
1. The burden is on the plaintiff to show
that the agreement supports a contractual
obligation, giving to plaintiff the right to
use the cut.
2. The use by plaintiff, without defendant's permission, of the latter's die, to produce the extra circulars, mars plaintiff 's
right to recover, since he cannot put in his
claim without revealing his own bad faith.
10 Barr 170; 23 Pa. 198; 11 S. & R. 164; 26
N. Y.- 217.
OPINION OF TIE COURT.
Gentlemen of the Jury:
This is an action brought by Win. Forbes
against Asa Packer, to recover for damages
sustained by the plaintiff in sending goods
by mistake to the defendant, and being retained by him.
We find a contract betxween the plaintiff
and defendant in this case, that Forbes,
the plaintiff, was to make a cut of Packer,
the defendant, at the rate of 5,000 for $35.
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In printing the cards Forbes printed 5100,
intending to use 100 to advertise hiq own
business as engraver. The employe of
Forbes by mistake put the 5100 cuts into
the package and delivered them to Packer,
who immediately paid the $35. Forbes
on discovering the mistake demanded the
100 circulars from Packer who refused to
deliver them, having already mailed
them, and having discovered the excessive number, intending to pay for them.
He also refused to allow Forbes to use the
cut in order to print other impressions
Forbes claims the value of the 100 circulars
to be worth $10 to him.
As to the latter part we have nothing to
do. It formed no part of the contract, and
if a person refuses to allow another to make
a cut of himself, an action at law will not
be sustained.
As to the former part, the goods being
delivered by the employe of Forbes, the
result will be the same as though they
were delivered by Forbes himself. There
is but one question remaining, and that is,
can Forbes recover for damages sustained
through his own mistake by impliedly
offering to contract with Packer for rhe
extra 100 cards at the contract price, which
offer was accepted by Packer. This offer
was accepted by Packer, and the circulars
were mailed before Forbes discovered the
mistake and demanded the goods, thus
making a binding contract. We, therefore,
think, sipce Forbes sustained damages
through his own fault, he cannot recover
the amount asked. McCown v. Quigley,
147 Pa. 307. We think that Forbes can
recover only 70 cents which Packer in
tended to pay before the bringing of this
action.
We, therefore, think that your verdict
should be for the defendant.
FRANK HEAYD RHODES, J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The contract between Forbes and Packer
required the former to make for the latter
a cut and to print 5000 copies of a circular
on which an impression of the cut was to
be made. The cut was when made to be
the property of Packer. Forbes had no
right to use it, except in order to produce
the5000 circulars. Had Packer been aware
of Forbes' intention to print for his own

use an extra hundred, he could bav'e prevented it by means of an injunction.
Forbes was not authorized either to employ the cut. for the production of these
circulars or to disseminate the circulars.
Levyeau v. Clements, 175 Mass. 376; 2
Beach Injunctions 888.
From this it follows that Forbes has suffered no wrong in being prevented by
Packer's act from dissninating the 100
circulars nor in being denied the use of the
die to produce another one hundred. The
loss therefore of whatever value the ability
to distribute the circulars would have conferred on them, is, if damnum at all, damnum absque injuria. It may be that the
100 additional circulars obtained by Packer
were worth 1,, him 70 cents. This is nearly the valuat,o put, oLt them by the contract. But, the point which is to decide
thp measure of Forbes' recovery is not the
gain to Packer bu1 Lhe loss to Forbes
Forbes had by putting the printers' ink on
the paper almost totally destroyed the
value of the paper. He could not legally
distribute the circulars. Indeed he could
probably be compelled to destroy them altogether

if

destruction were the only

reasonable security against the improper
dissemination of them, 175 Mass. 376. Of.
Phillips v. Homfray, 24 ('h. D. 439. The
aim of the theories of quasi-contracts is to
do equity between parties. We are not
cmvinced that it is inequitable to refuse

compensation to Forbesfor circulars which
he produced with an intent so to use them
as to inflict a wrong on Packer, and which
had no other value than that which this
use imparted to them.
Packer in sending out the circulars discovered that they were in excess of the
contract number, and apparently intended
to pay for them. This intention is not decisive of a duty to pay. Was it formed
with knowledge of the improper purpose
with which the supernumerary circulars
had been produced? He might well have
intended to pay for them if they had been
mistakenly printed without having any
such intention when he discovered that
their printing had been with a design unlawful as to himself.
The 100 circulars have, by Forbes' act,
been mingled with the 5000, so that they
cannot be distinguished. The effect of a
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confusion of goods has been only imperfectly developed in the decisions of this
state, McDowell v. Rissell. 37 Pa. 164; Henderson v. Lauck, 21 Pa. 359; Winlack v.
Geist, 107 Pa. 297. Cf. 6 Am. & Eng.
Encyc of Law, 594, and we concede that it
is difficult to justify the doctrine that
when A even tortiously mingles his 10
quarts of coal-oil with B's one quart of the
same sort of oil or his ten bushels of coal
with B's one bushel of the same sort of
coal, A makes the 11 quarts or the 11
bushels B's. Since the oils and coals are
of the same quality no harm is done to B,
if A is allowed to take all except the quantity which was originally B's. The 100
circulars were indistinguishable from the
5000 and the mere confusion could have
caused no harm to Packer had Forbes
taken 100 from the package leaving 5000
for him. Levyeau v. Clements, 175 Mass.
376, however, makes the severer application of the principle of confusion and practically holds that Forbes forfeited the 100
by refson of it. This result, in view of the
improper use to which Forbes intended to
put the 100 circulars, is not unjust.
What we have said indicates that the
plaintiff cannot recover $15 for he is not
entitled to the use of the circulars, and he
does not pretend that he has suffered a loss
of $15 if they were unusable. It also indicates that he cannot recover the 70 cents.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN HANKS vs. ADAM COFFEY.
Action in assumapsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the death of Anios Coffey, his son
Adam being at a distant place, came to
his father's house and superintended arrangements for the funeral. Hanks was
a singer who rather often was called on to
sing at funerals, sometimes obtaining pay
and sometimes not. He had well known
the deceased, sometimes calling at the
house. In the conversation between defendant and Hanks the latter asked who
was going to be the administrator and Jefendant said that, though he was the
younger son and not living at home, he
thought he would be. Hanks attended

the funeral, singing three hymns. Some
days afterwards Jas. Coffey's eldest son,
with the consent of all the family, took
Hanks,
out letters of administration.
however, demanded pay of $15.00 from
Adam Coffey, who refused to pay. Hanks
brought this action before a justice of the
peace.
E. A. DELANEY and MCGUFFIE for
plaintiff.
1. When services are rendered by one
person to another, the law presumes a
promise, on the part-of him who has received, to pay what the services are
reasonably worth. Smith v. Mlilligan, 43
Pa. 107; 5 Penna. C. C. 321; Fillich's Estate, 9 Pa. C. C. 25; 4 Dal 111; 9 Phila. 118;
6 Sup. Court 341; 7 Wright 107.
2; Where a person, assuming without
authority to act as agent for another, enters into a contract, either in his own
name or in that of alleged principal, the
party with whom he contracts may elect
to consider him as the principal and hold
him liable on the contract. MbConn v.
Lady, 10 W. N. C. 493; Henry v. Milve,
43 Pa. 418; 104 Pa. 368; 47 Ohio 525;
Burgan v. Cahoon, 1 Penuy 320.
WRIGHT and COOPER for defendant.
1. Services voluntarily performed, wi, i
or without the defendant's consent, however beneficial, afford no ground for an
action for payment. Anderson v. Hanmilton Township, 2-5 Pa. 75; Bartholomew v.
Jackson, 20 Johns 28; Doyle v. Trinity
Church, 133 N. Y, 372; Insurance Co. v.
Beatty, 119 Pa. 6; Houch v. Bouch, 99 Pa.
552.
2. The circumstances are not such as to
permit plaintiff to make the doctrine of
estoppel. Com. v. Nulty, 10 Pa. 530;
Millens Appeal. 84 Pa. 3 5; 99 Pa. 432; 120
Mass. 79; Hill v. Eply, 31 Pa. 3.34
3. The action is improperly brought; if
plaintiff has an action it is against the
administrator of the estate. Act of Feb.
24, 1834. P. &L. Dig. Decedents estates.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Between the parties to this litigation we
are unable to discover any evidence of a
contract. The contract alleged to exist
was not founded upon any writing, words
or acts by the defendant. Itwas founded
upon mere silence, and the counsel for the
plaintiff have failed to furnish any instance of silence in which a contractual
relation might have been established.
The ficts are clear. Hanks wasa singer,
who was rather often called upon to sing
at funerals, sometimes obtaining pay and
sometimes not. He lived at a distance,
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was a friend of the decedent, sometimes
calling at his house. The learned counsel
for the defendant has properly said that
"it does not appear that he made singing
a practice in the way of a livelihood. He
had sung at funerals before, perhaps from
a sense of friendliness towards the deceased, or at the request of the decedent's
family."
True it is, as the counsel for the plaintiff
argue, that the performance and receipt of
services generally raises an implied promife to pay for them. This is "generally"
the case. But a careful perusal of the law
on this subject will convince the examiner
that in all cases, except that of parent and
child, there must be evidence beyond the
relationship that the creation of a debt
was intended. Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa.
371. Was there any such evidence in this
case? Was there anything done or anything said that would lead one to infer
that the parties intended to create a debt?
Manifestly there was no agreement. The
Fact that Hanks asked Adam Coffey, the
defedatt, who was going to be the administrator has I'een cited by theplaintiff's
counsel as ii'dicatiig the plaintiff's expectation of a reward. No weight can be
attached to such a question. The inquiry
was a very natural one-one that any
friend would be likely to make in the
course of ordiiarv eonver. ation. Thereis
no reason to think that the defendant did
not suppose that the services were given
spontaneously, from kindly motives and
with charitable intentions. The relation
of the parties, the nattire of the services
and all the pertinent facts cannotjustify
the inference that the plaintiff was singing
for money, or that the defendant understood that pay was to be expected.
The services of Hanks were voluntarily
rendered, and a loag line of authorities
support the doctrine that a voluntary act,
performed without request, does not,
although beneficial to the other, afford a
legal cause of action for compensation;
that the act was necessary does not alter
the case. P. & L. Dig. Vol. 3, Col. 4642:
Anderson v. Hamilton Township, 2.5 Pa.
76.
In Royal Ens. Co. v. Beatty, 119 Pa. 11,
the facts were insufficient tojustify a legal
inference of a contract where "the whole

of the plaintiff's case is an unanswered
request to the defendant to make a contract with the plaintiff, and no further
attempt by the plaintiff to obtain an answer, and no actual contract made." How
much less, then, is a legal liability on the
part of the defendant created when no request at all has been made.
There was, in our opinion, no agreement, express or implied. The services
were volunteered, and there is nothing to
indicate fairly that Hanks expected compensation for his services.
Judgment for defendant.
MALCOLM

B.

STERRETT, J.

CHAS.TH ORNE vs. PHILIP ALRICK.
Danages-Inde-,ndent contractor-Liabilityfor negligence in performing contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thorne and Alrick owned adjacent lots.
On Thorne's was a residence 3 stories high
where east wall coincided with the division
line between the lots Alrick decided to
erect a warehouse on his lot; made a contract with Zeiner & Co., to erect it. The
specifications called for a cellar 16 ft. deep.
In making the excavation, necessary
measures to prevent the fallipg in of the
soil of the Thorne lot were omitted, and
when the depth of 8 ft. had been reached,
the entire wall of Thorne's lot fell in and
the house was demolished.
This is trespass for damages. Zeiner &
Co., were contractors for the erection of
buildings, and undertook to do all the
work, having absolute discretion as to
means ; the plans and specifications of the
building being the only restriction in their
discretion.
The contract price was $2.5,000.
GARY and FBBERT for plaintiff.
1. Where a person dig up the soil of a
contiguous lot whereby the foundation
walls of a house are injured, such person
is liable in daniages to the owner of the
injured house. Pariton v. Holland, 17
Johns 92; Horran v. Stanley, 16 P. L.
Smith 464; Atwater v. Woods, 1 W. N. C.
23.
2. The employer will be liable, if the
injurious act complailped of was contemplated by the contract, or if the contract
work is necessarily harmful. City ofBuffalo
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v. Holloway, TN. Y. 492; Dorrity v. Rapp,
72 N. Y. 307.
BISHOP and DONAHOE for defendant.
1. Where the contractor is independent
of his employer in all that pertains to the
execution of the work, and is subordinate
only in the design, the employer is not
liable for the negligence of the contractor
in the execution ofthe work. Harrison v.
Collins. 86 Pa. 153; Smith v. Simmon's,
103 Pa. 32; Reynolds v. Braithwaite, 131
Pa. 416; Gas Co. v. Lynch, 118 Pa. 362.
2. To render a person liable for the
negligence of another, the relati,,n ofmaster and servant or principal and agenT
must exist between them. Blake v.Ferris,
5 N. Y. 48; 57 Pa. 273; 80 Pa. 120.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action by the plaintiff to recover damages for trespass by the defendant, who is the owner of a lot adjoining
that of plaintiff. As au incident to the
right of property in lands, the proprietor
cannot make excayations upon his land
which will deprive the adjoining land of
that lateral support which is necessary to
keel) it from falling in. This rule, however, ik not applicable under all circumstances. The plaintiff's statement reads
that '"Zeiner & Co. were the contractors
and undertook to do the work, having absolute discretion as to the means," the
ph,is and specifications of the building
being the only restrictions placed upon
thein l)y the owner. The consideration
for the performance of the contract was
S2;5,000. The question now arises as to the
relation created between the owner of lot,
Philip Alrick, and the contractor. In
Harrison v. Collins, 5 Norris 153, Mr.
Justice Mercer says, "that if one renders
service, in course of occupation representing the will of employer only as to the
result of work and not as to the means by
which itis to be accomplished, itis an independent employment. Smith v. Simons,
103 Pa. 32; Hookey v. Oakdale Borough,
5 Sup. 404. Therefor-, the relation of
independent contractor is well established
in this case.
There remains, then, the question of liability of tie defendant for thenegligence of
Zeiner & Co. in making the excavations
necessary, the measures to prevent the falling in ofthe Thorne lot were omitted. The
owner of an adjoining lot is not liable for
injuries resulting from the acts of an inde-

pendent contractor, unless lie has failed
to give notice to the adjoining owners
that the undertaking is- hazardous. In
Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, the
court held " that if the owner had retained
the right to direct the manner in which
the details of work done by ai, independent contractor, he is liable only if lie
exercises this right." The plaintiffoffered
no evidence that the task was an hazardous one, such as would require notice being
given by the defendant. In the absence
of evidence of negligence on part of defendant, and on the ground that this was
not in our opinion a dangerous undertaking, under these conditions the defendant
is not liable for injuries resulting from the
negligence of an independent contractor.
Gas Co. v. Lynch, 118 Pa. 362; Thomas v.
R. R. Co., 191 Pa. 361; Edmnundson v. P.
MI.& Y. R. R. Co., 111 Pa. 316.
Judgment.for defendant.
TURNER,J.

THE 0. & W. RY. CO. vs. ALLAN
LANE, SHERIFF.
Trespass-Levy on coporationpropertyWhat exempt from levy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Plaintiff owns railway thirty miles long.
entirely in Pennsylvania and connecting
two towns. There are no other connecting lines. Under execution on judgment
of S10,000 against the company the defendant levied upon a locomotive, derailed it
and put a deputy in charge. There was
plenty of personal property, known to the
Sheriff, out of which judgment might have
been satisfied.
This is an action for trespass as on realty
and for value of engine.
KEMP and FRANK for plaintiff.
Property of corporation is exempt from
levy. Fosterv. Fowler, 60 Pa.27; Johnson
Co. v. Miller, 174 Pa. 605.
Sheriff is liable for abuse of authority,
Wilson v. Ellis, 28 Pa. 2.38.
MARX for defendant.
Defendant notguilty of tresspass on realty
as he acted under authority of process regularly issued by court having jurisdiction.
Bellings v. Russel, 23 Pa. 189; Hodgson v.
Millward, 3 Grawl 406.
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Locomotives are personal property and
defendant by holding locomotive committed no trespass on realty. R. R. v.
Luermore, 47 Pa. 467; Youngnan v. R. R.,
65 Pa. 278.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant prays for a non-sui
against the plaintiff for the reason that
the plaintiff has failed in establishing the
facts necessary to sustain this action. We
cannot in this case enter a non-suit for the
simple reason that we think the plaintiffs
have a plain cause of action.
The defendant contends, that the writ
giving him authority to levy had issued
from a court having jurisdiction, also that
it was regular, and that defendant acted
within the authority conferred by the
writ. This may all be true, but notwithstanding this the writ was irregular, for
this reason. According to the 72nd section
of the Act of June 16th, 1836, regulating
exeoutions against corporations "The officer charged with the execution of such
writ shall go to the banking house, or
other principal office of such corporation,
during the usual office hours and demand
of the president, or other chief officer,
treasurer, secretary, chief clerk or other
officer, having charge of such office, the
amount of such e.zecution, with legal
costs." Until this requirement had been
complied with sequestration could not
take place. Sequestration under the Act
of 1836 was abolished by section 1 -of Act
April, 1870 and execution by ft. fa. was
substituted.
It has been expressly decided, however,
that whatever was a necessary prelimiuary
to sequestration under the Act of 1836,
must now be done before the ft. fa. given
by the Act of 1870, can issue. Flagg v.
Farnsworth, 12 W. N. C. 500.
It is clear therefore, that as no demand
in accordance with section 72 Act of 1836
was made by the officer charged with the
ft. fa. it was irregular and should be set
aside. But conceding that the demand
was made, the writ could not subject the
The Act of
locomotive to execution.
April 7, 1870 extending the right of execution against a corporation to all its
property, was not intended to subject
property, before exempt to execution piecemeal. The franchises must be levied on
and sold as an entirety. The property of

a railroad corporation in actual use for the
purposes prescribed in its charter, is not
liable to levy apart from the franchises of
the company.
In principle, though the subject matter
is somewhat different, the cases of Johnson
v. Miller, 174 Pa. 605 and Sus. Canal Co.
v. Bonham, 9 W. & S. 27 are authorities in
point. In the latter case Justice Seargant
says "It has always been held and our
acts of assembly are construed on the idea
that the franchises and corporate rights of
the corporation and the means vested in
them, which are necessary to the existence
and maintenance of the great public object
for which they were created, are incapable
of being granted away and transferred by
any act of the corporation itself, or by process of another against it in invitum."
Again in Coe v. Hart, Justice McLean remarked "The railroad, like a complicated
machine, consists in a great number of
parts, a combined action of which is essential to produce revenue. And as well
might a creditor claim the right to levy on
an abstract, some essential from a planing
machine, or any other combination of
machinery, as to take from a railroad, its
locomotives or its passenger cars."
Counsel for the defense placed great
stress upon the fact that the plaintiff
brought the action against defendant for
tiespass on the realty. But we do not
think this to be a very material point, so
we will not enter into a discussion of it, in
this opinion. The main question to dispose of is, did the defendant have the right
to levy upon the locomotive? And we do
not think he did, as was said in, Johnson
v. Miller, 174 Pa. 605, the Judge commenting on the right of creditors to sell property of a public corporation, which is essential to the exercise of its franchise says
"It is undoubtedly the rule that when the
operations of a corporation are matters of
direct public interest and concern, its
property which is reasonably essential to
the exercise of its franchises, cannot be
aliened by the corporation or sold by its
creditors piecemeal so as to stop its operations or defeat the object of its charter."
A railroad corporation is but a servant
of the State, and while it has private ends
it must obtain them through a faithful
discharge of its obligation to the public,
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sheriffcan be held liable for any unlawful
conversion of realty into personalty in
privileges, but it is evidence of their cdn- order that he might levy on the locomotive as of the latter clas-, because the locosideration arising in the public benefit.
motive was already personalty.
and of its contract to subserve this purpose. If it may be dismantled by seizing
The locomotive, however, is one of the
those things most essential to its existarticles of personal property the possession
ence, it would be powerless to serve the
of which is essential to the performance
public or benefit itself.
by the company of its public function of
For the reasons herein stated, we think
transportation. The tracks without locothe defendant was guilty of tresl3ass and
motives, cars, etc., would be useless. It
that the plaintiff company should recover
has long been the policy of the state, not
the value of the engine.
to permit the property, whether real or
Judgment for plaiitiff.
personal, of a quasi-public corporation to
HARRY P. KATZ, J.
be discerped and torn, part from part, by
creditors. This policy was expressed in
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
the 73d section of the Adt of June 16, 1836.
A judgment was recovered against the It requires a demand on the principal
officer of the corporation by the sheriff, to
plaintiff for $10,000. It was the right of
whom a fi. fa has been issued, for paythe creditor to issue an execution upon it.
By no other method could he obtain satis- ment. It theu pernii isalevy on detached
personalty or realty, that is, personalty or
faction. He accordingly caused to issue a
realty whose possession is not essential to
fierifacias. Upon this writ itbecame the
duty of the sheriff to seize personal prop- the exercise of the franchises in which tle
public has an interest-East Side Bank v.
erty of the debtor, if he could find any that
Columbus Tanning Co., 170 Pa. 1; and if
under the law vwas leviable. We are told
no sufficient property of this class is found,
that "there was plenty of personal propauthorizes a return of nilla bona, and
erty, known to the sheriff, out 9f which
thereupon a sequestration of the franthe judgment might have been satisfied."
chises and the thereto essential property
What the personalty was, and how it was
of the corporation. The whole of this prorelated to the operations and road of the
cess is still required, save the sequestracompany, we are not informed. This
tion. Instead of that the Act of April 7,
property, amenable, as the company con1870, authorizes the iss, - of a second and
cedes, to levy, the sheriff did not seize.
specialfieri facial,%
commanding the sheriff
He levied, rather, upon a locomotive,
to levy on personal and real property and
which was standing, apparently, on the
franchises of the corporation, and to sell
track, and removed it therefrom, putting
the same. Smith v. Altoona, etc., R. R.
a deputy in charge of it.
It seems to be assumed by the plaintiff Co., 182 Pa. 139;'Mausel v. New York,
etc., Railway Co., 171 Pa. 606; East Side
that the locomotive was realty, a part of
the road. From this premise it is argued ,Bank v. Columbus Tanning Co., 170 Pa. 1;
Lusk's Appeal, 108 Pa. 152.
that the sheriff had no right to separate it
from the road, and treat it as a distinct
In order to levy and sell property of a
subject of levy. The conclusion would
quasi-public coporation, deeded to public
doubtless follow. We have, however, not
functions, it is necessary (1) to issue a
been referred to any authority for the doc- fierifacias,(2) for the sheriff to demand
trine that a locomotive becomes, so far as
payment at the principal office of the corthe corporation or third persons are conporation, (3) to levy on detached property,
cerned, realty. That doctrine is not found
i. e., property whose retention by the corin Phila., etc., R. R. v. Woelpfer, 64 Pa.
poration is not needful for the execution
366. Rolling stock is considered personal ty
of its public work; (4) if none such, in sufby many courts. Pierce, Railroads, 475
ficient quantity, is found to return the ft.
(Ed. 1881); Act June 12, 1878; 2 P. & L.
fa. nul a bona; (5) then to issue a special
3964; Covey v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., fieri facias, and (6) under it, tolevy on the
3 Phila. 173. We do not think that the
franchises, and all the property, real and
for whose benefits its powers are conferred.

Its charter is not only the grant of its own
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personal, essential to the public utilities,
as a single and undecomposable mass.
It is evident that the sheriff, Allen
Lane, did not observe this order of procedn:e. He knew that the defendant was
a railroad corporation. He knew, moreever, that the locomotive on which he
levied was in actual use on the road and
was needful for the performance of the
peculiar work of the corporation. He knew,
ideed, that he had no right to levy on
any property at all until he had demanded
payment from the president or other officer
at the principal office, and he further
knew that, even if he had made such demand, and without effect, lie could not
properly levy on the locomotive as a
separate chattel and deprive the corporation of its use even temporarily.
It does not appear that the locomotive
has been sold by the sheriff The action
seems to be for the sheriff's interference
with the plaintiff's possessiou and use of it
by. means of the levy. Had there been a
sale though it would have been irregular
and, on the seasonable application of the
corporation would have been set aside, it
would in the absence of such objection by
the company have conferred a good title on
the purchaser; Lusk's Appeal, 108 Pa. 152.
The sheriff has not sold the locomotive,
and probably has relinquished his levy.
We are to determine whether lie is liable
to the corporation for his improper seizure
of the locomotive. We think he is. The
fifa was no warrant to him. to seize any
property until the corporation, after de-

mand, had refused to pay the debt. qo
far as appears it would have been paid had
demand been made. But even had demand
been fruitlessly made, the writ would have
been no warrant for the seizure of the locomotive. In taking it, removing it froi
the tracks and placing it in charge of a
deputy, the sheriff was guilty o" a tre.-pass.
He has no authority to take the property
of persons except that which under1d Iinite
conditions the law confers ou him. If io
prevent the defendant from taking $300
worth of property under the stat utory exemption, renders the sheriff or constable -1
trespasser al intio, Wilson v. Ellis, 28 Pa.
238; the seizure of property without giving
the defendant the opportunity to d ischarge
the debt by a demand would render him
such. But more clearly does he become
such when he levies on a locomotive and
interrupts the corporation's possession and
u-e of it, if the writ in his hands, interpreted by the relevantstatute, of which
he is bound to take notice, confers uroll
him no power to make such levy.
It is true that, onl the application of the
corporation, the court would have arrested
(he sale of the locomotive had it been attempted, Mausel v. N. Y. etc. Ry. Co.,
171 Pa. 606; but that would not have obliterated the damage caused by the temporary expropriation of the company by the
acts of the sheriff. For this damage it is
clearly entitled to compensation.
The
judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

